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ったが、2019 年の選挙では対立の場はサイバー空間へと移った。インドネシアは、約 2 億
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COVID-19 HANDLING IN A FRACTURED POLITY: CASE OF INDONESIA 
 
Irman G. Lanti 
April 2020 
 
When I mentioned to my Indonesian friends and family about the spread of Covid-19 in Japan in early 
February, nobody could relate to it. But now, all the Indonesian news and social media outlets that I am 
attached to seem to have no other newsworthy piece than Covid-19. Indonesians are rushing to grocery 
stores and drug stores to hoard masks and other things, not unlike any other people in the world, 
including Japanese for that matter. But one thing seems to stand out from the Indonesian case in dealing 
with Covid-19. It has reopened the wounds caused by deep rifts created in the run up to last year’s 
elections, and risks negating the results from the vigorous and energy-draining efforts to close them. 
 
2019 Presidential Election and Rise of Islamist Group 
 
In 2019, Indonesia witnessed the most divisive elections in the history of the nation, where President 
Joko Widodo (a.k.a. Jokowi) sought reelection. The rise of Islamist groups uniting behind the rival 
candidate, Prabowo, and the determined effort to resist the rise by the nationalist Jokowi has created 
tense and polarizing campaigns. If in the past, conflicts surrounding elections in Indonesia tended to 
revolve around mass gathering campaigns, last year’s elections saw the conflicts move to the 
cyberspace. Indonesia has one the world’s highest number of social media users, with 160 million users 
out of its 270 million population. So the political conflict in cyberspace became a noisy one with fake 
news after fake news flying around. The effect of such political conflict was also quite massive, pitting 
friends and family members against each other. 
 
The resurgence of the Islamist group started out with a bang. In December 2, 2016, massive people 
mobilization against Jokowi occurred, that culminated in the larger political demonstration ever 
happened in Indonesia, attended by hundreds of thousands in the center of Jakarta. The demonstration 
was launched against the religious blasphemy allegedly done by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), the 
Governor of Jakarta, an ethnic Chinese Indonesian who served as the Vice Governor when Jokowi was 
Governor of the capital city (known as Action 212 in December 2, 2016). 
 
Jokowi won the reelection in 2019 with a slightly greater margin than what he got in the previous 
elections in 2014, but the divisiveness did not subside. A lawsuit aimed at nullifying the result of the 
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elections was launched, preceded by a number of demonstrations in Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia 
that often ended in violence. The government responded by nabbing a number of opposition figures 
and prosecuted them. 
 
This political schism in the society seemed to come to an end when the new cabinet line-up was 
announced in October 2019. Various political efforts behind the scene to reunite the country resulted 
in the acceptance of Prabowo (Jokowi’s rival in the elections) to join Jokowi’s cabinet as Minister of 
Defense. For a while the Islamist groups seemed to be inactive while apparently attempted to find an 
alternative figure to rally behind after the loss of Prabowo to Jokowi’s camp. The society also seemed 
to gradually make amends from the fracture that befell them in the long year of campaigning. 
 
Covid-19 and Social Fraction 
 
And then Covid-19 struck. Indonesia was among one of the late countries that reported the Covid 
infection. Its first case was announced only on March 2, long after the virus struck neighboring 
countries, like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. But the intensity of the subsequent 
domestic transmission of the virus was quite alarming, although not quite at a rate that we saw in China, 
the US, South Korea, Iran, and European countries. Six weeks after the first was reported, there are 
now over 5,000 confirmed Covid infection cases in Indonesia. What was probably more alarming was 
the high fatality rate in Indonesia, which stands at around nine percent, much higher than the global 
average of around 4.5% nowadays. 
 
The pace of surge in Indonesia’s cases of Covid 19 actually resembles more its neighboring countries, 
rather than the quick upsurge that we’ve seen in South Korea, Iran, and Italy, and now the US and 
European countries. However, the adverse panic reaction of Indonesians probably exceeds that of other 
countries. The Covid incident actually reveals the lack of trust of many Indonesians of government 
services, especially on the health sector. It also reveals the acute deficiency in how the government 
manages its public communication strategy, especially in the digital age like today. 
 
But perhaps the more interesting side of the story of Indonesia’s handling of Covid-19 is what happened 
on the socio-political front. The image of national unity shown after the inclusion of Prabowo as one 
of Jokowi’s cabinet member seems to be basically just that, an image. The reality surrounding the 
Covid issue shows that the fraction in the Indonesian society along political lines, which in Indonesia 




Nowadays, Indonesians are witnessing a return of the bout in the social media. Those who tended to 
oppose Jokowi during the last election seem to receive new ammunition to rejuvenate the attack on the 
President, especially over the tentative and erratic handling of the Covid-19. Those who supported the 
President try to defend and rationalize the administration’s policy. 
 
Competition between President and Jakarta Governor 
 
Interestingly, there seems to be a heightened competition between Jokowi and the Jakarta Governor, 
Anies Baswedan. Anies won the governorship of the capital city in 2017, after defeating Ahok who 
was tainted by religious blasphemy case. Anies was supported by Islamist parties and is widely seen as 
one of the frontrunners for 2024 elections. Jokowi will not be able to run again in next election because 
of the constitutional limit of two-terms for presidents, but the nationalist camp will most likely attempt 
to court a figure to succeed Jokowi. 
 
During the Covid-19 handling, the two figures appeared keen to outdo each other. Anies seemed to 
have an upper hand when he announced that Jakarta has come to a dangerous situation regarding the 
spread of the virus. He came close to announcing a state of emergency in Jakarta, only to be reminded 
by the Central government that the power to do so lies in the hand of the central and not local 
governments. He also developed a web-based system that can be accessed by the public about the 
spread of the virus in various districts in the city. All these were done at the time when the central 
government still looked very tentative in its steps and some figures in the administration, including the 
Minister of Health, still appeared dismissive of the veracity of the virus spread in Indonesia. Anies was 
cheered loudly by the Islamist supporters, and the general public has generally seen a marked 
improvement from the poor handling of the flooding that hit Jakarta just a few weeks prior. Anies’ 
detractors tried to find any loophole in his policy in handling Covid-19, and seemed to have a field day 
when citizens were complaining about the cutbacks in the schedule of public transportation that caused 
massive crowding in train stations and bus stops. 
 
On the other hand, the central government was criticized heavily for appearing unprepared for the surge 
of the infection, creating almost a condition of mass hysteria. Amidst these criticisms, Jokowi suddenly 
announced that Indonesia would import two million pills of Avigan, a flu medicine produced by 
Fujifilm Toyama and three million pills of chloroquine. The efficacy of these two medicines to cure 
Covid-19 patients are still under testing in many countries in the world, including in Japan. But the 
Indonesian government worked in a lightning speed and two days after the news of Avigan’s supposed 
efficacy appeared in some media outlets, and WHO was still doubtful of the efficacy of chloroquine, 
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millions of pills of these medicines have arrived on an Indonesian Air Force transport in Jakarta military 
airport. Some analysts perceived that such haste was motivated by the desire to appear decisive and 
quick to make up for some of the loss in positive imagery of the nationalist government to the Islamist 
Jakarta Governor. 
 
Covid-19 and “New Normal” of Indonesian Politics 
 
More recently, the central and local governments appear to have been working more closely with each 
other. On April 10, the Jakarta government has implemented the Major Scale Social Restriction (PSBB) 
in the metropolitan based on the approval of central government on the request from Jakarta 
government to implement such restriction. This was then followed by the enactment of similar 
restrictions in the Jakarta hinterland areas of West Java and Banten provinces on April 15. However, 
Anies’ supporters appeared to be unimpressed by the central government’s decision, calling it late and 
insufficient. On the other hand, flak also continued to come from the nationalist camp, especially 
criticizing Anies and the Jakarta government for failing to enforce the restriction as evidenced from the 
continued buzz and traffic around Jakarta despite the restriction. 
 
Elections are still four years away in Indonesia. The presence of the Covid-19 shock has demonstrated 
that the socio-political fracture in the Indonesian polity remains prevalent. Perhaps in the future such a 
fraction will be viewed as a new normal. But at least for now, the public is being served with a hint of 
how the next elections in Indonesia will transpire. 
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